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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Defendant, Carole Diaz, a/k/a Carole M. Cefaratti 
("Diaz"), pled guilty to a four-count information that 
included charges of fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 1341 
and 1342, and money laundering, in the form of engaging 
in a monetary transaction in property derived from 
specified unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1957(a). She was sentenced under the federal Sentencing 
Guidelines to a term of 33 months in prison,fined, and 
ordered to pay restitution to the United States Department 
of Education ("DOE") in the amount of $846,000. 
 
On appeal, Diaz challenges two aspects of her sentence. 
First, she argues that the District Court err ed in computing 
her prison term based on the sentencing guideline 
applicable to the money laundering charge, U.S.S.G. 
S 2S1.2, rather than the guideline applicable to the fraud 
charge, U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1. The latter guideline would have 
resulted in 6-12 fewer months in prison. This issue 
requires us to consider whether Amendment 591 to the 
Sentencing Guidelines, effective on November 1, 2000, 
should apply retroactively to Diaz's sentence and whether 
our decision in United States v. Smith, 186 F.3d 297 (3d 
Cir. 1999) remains good law, at least for sentences imposed 
prior to the effective date of the amended guidelines. If 
Smith is still applicable to Diaz's situation, we must also 
review and reconcile several recent opinions interpreting 
Smith and the "heartland" of the money laundering 
guideline, including United States v. Mustafa , 238 F.3d 485 
(3d Cir. 2001), United States v. Bockius , 228 F.3d 305 (3d 
Cir. 2000), and a decision involving the same issue from 
Diaz's brother and co-misfeasor, United States v. Cefaratti, 
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221 F.3d 502 (3d Cir. 2000). Second, Diaz challenges the 
amount of restitution she was order ed to pay. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we hold that Diaz should 
have been sentenced under the fraud guideline rather than 
the money laundering guideline, and we will vacate the 
sentence and remand this case to the District Court for 
resentencing under S 2F1.1. We will affirm the decision of 
the District Court with regard to the amount of restitution 
that Diaz must pay. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTOR Y 
 
Diaz, along with her brother, Frank Cefaratti ("Cefaratti"), 
and her sister, owned the Franklin School of Cosmetology 
and Hair Design ("Franklin School"), a for -profit vocational 
school for aspiring beauticians. Diaz and Cefaratti were 
responsible for day-to-day operations, with Diaz primarily 
in charge from 1992 through July 1994, when her siblings 
bought her out and Cefaratti assumed control of the school. 
 
The Franklin School participated in federal student 
financial assistance programs, including the Pell Grant 
Program, in which financially needy students obtained 
grants to cover tuition and expenses,1  and the Federal 
Stafford Loan Program, through which students could 
obtain federally guaranteed, low-interest loans from private 
lenders.2 The Franklin School was authorized to act as a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Pell Grant funds are transferred fr om the United States Treasury 
directly to the school's trust account, wher e they are held in trust 
until 
the school is authorized to transfer the money into its operating account 
to pay the student's bills for tuition and other expenses. Students need 
not repay Pell Grant funds. 
 
2. Stafford loans are guaranteed against default by state and private not- 
for-profit guarantee agencies. In the event of default by the student- 
borrower, the lender may file a default claim against the guarantee 
issued by the guarantee agency, which, if unable to recover from the 
student, in turn is authorized to seek r eimbursement for the loss from 
the DOE. Stafford funds are mailed by the private lender to the school 
in the form of a check made payable to the student and the school. Once 
the student endorses the check, the school deposits it into its account 
to cover the student's expenses. 
 
                                3 
  
disbursing agent for Pell Grants and to receive Stafford loan 
checks. 
 
In order to participate in the programs, Diaz and others, 
on behalf of the Franklin School, agreed with the DOE that 
the school would comply with all program rules and 
regulations, would use the funds advanced solely for the 
specified educational purposes, and would pr operly account 
for the funds received. DOE regulations limit eligible 
students to those who had a high school diploma or a 
general educational development program diploma ("GED") 
or had passed a test demonstrating their ability to benefit 
from the training offered by the school. The DOE may limit 
or terminate a school's participation in federal student 
financial assistance programs if the school's students 
default at excessive rates. A student is consider ed in 
default if, after 180 days, the student has not made 
repayments on the loan and has not requested and been 
granted deferment, forbearance, or some other temporary 
postponement of repayment obligations. Repayment 
obligations begin six months after a student has left school. 
The DOE determines default rates accor ding to the 
percentage of students who must begin r epayment in a 
given fiscal year and who default prior to the end of the 
following year. Under the regulations, default rates 
exceeding 25 percent for three consecutive years may result 
in a school's automatic termination fr om the Stafford Loan 
Program and default rates in excess of 40 per cent for one 
year make a school subject to termination fr om the Pell 
Grant Program. 
 
Beginning in or around October 1992, Diaz dir ected 
employees of the Franklin School to prepar e and mail 
falsified forbearance and deferment for ms to lenders in the 
name of former Franklin School students who had obtained 
financial assistance and were close to defaulting. These 
employees, at Diaz's direction, forged student signatures on 
these forms, used language given to them by Diaz in 
completing the forms, and falsely repr esented themselves, 
in telephone conversations with lenders, as for mer Franklin 
School students needing deferment or forbearance forms.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Only former students could request and receive such forms. 
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Diaz then caused the Pell funds received fr om the Treasury 
and the Stafford funds received fr om private lenders to be 
transferred from Virginia and Pennsylvania to the school's 
account in New Jersey. During the time that Diaz dir ected 
the school and used these funds for its operation, the 
school was a legitimate enterprise. 
 
Diaz also directed that a Franklin School employee 
prepare and mail a false federal student loan application, in 
the name of Carole Diaz, to several private banks to 
determine whether they would make loans to Franklin 
School students. In early 1994, a bank in Wilkes Barre, 
Pennsylvania, made a loan to Carole Diaz and mailed a 
check in the amount of $2,625, payable to the Franklin 
School and Carole Diaz, which Diaz deposited into her 
personal account. Franklin School employees, again at 
Diaz's direction, completed and submitted false attendance 
status reports for "Carole Diaz" to the New Jersey Higher 
Education Assistance Authority. Finally, Diaz dir ected 
employees to officially register "Car ole Diaz" as a student 
and to create a file in that name, in the event of an audit. 
 
In 1993, the DOE determined that the Franklin School's 
default rates for 1991 and 1992 had exceeded 50 per cent; 
the school therefore faced termination from the federal 
assistance programs if its default rate was again excessive 
in 1993. Ninety percent of the Franklin School's revenues 
came from federal student financial assistance funds; thus, 
the school would likely have been forced to close if it were 
terminated from the programs. In February 1996, the DOE 
determined the school's 1993 default rate to be 9.5 percent, 
a falsely and artificially low figure that was based on the 
false forbearance and deferment forms submitted at Diaz's 
instruction between 1992 and July 1994. The false forms 
made it appear that numerous former Franklin School 
students had received deferment or forbearance, when in 
fact they were in default. The true default rate was much 
higher than 25 percent and, but for the fraudulent 
deferment and forbearance forms, would have resulted in 
the school being terminated from the federal student 
financial assistance programs in February 1996. The 
submission of the false forms enabled the school to remain 
in the programs and therefore to continue operating 
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through and beyond July 1994, when Diaz was r emoved 
from her position and replaced by Cefaratti. The school 
continued to receive Stafford and Pell funds until July 
1997, when it was terminated from thefinancial assistance 
programs. Between February 1996 and July 1997, the 
school received and deposited approximately $846,000 in 
funds from the Pell and Stafford pr ograms. The school was 
not legally entitled to these funds and it would not have 
received them but for the use of false forbearance and 
deferment forms. 
 
Diaz was charged in a four-count infor mation, filed on 
March 11, 1999, in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania. Count I char ged mail 
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 1341 and 1342, based on 
the mailing of falsified forbearance forms in April 1994; 
Count II charged federal student assistance fraud, in 
violation of 20 U.S.C. S 1097(a), based on the school's 
receipt of student loan and grant funds fr om October 1992 
until July 1997; Count III charged money laundering under 
18 U.S.C. S 1957(a),4 based on the deposit of the Stafford 
and Pell funds into the school's accounts, again covering 
the period from 1992 until July 1997; and Count IV 
charged making a false statement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1014, based on the loan application submitted in the 
name of "Carole Diaz." Also on Mar ch 11, Diaz entered into 
a plea agreement, waiving indictment and pleading guilty to 
the four counts in the information. The United States 
agreed not to bring any other criminal char ges, other than 
possible criminal tax charges, against Diaz based on her 
involvement in these offenses. It also agr eed to recommend 
a prison sentence within the guideline range and to 
recommend that Diaz receive a three-point reduction in her 
offense level if she clearly demonstrated acceptance of 
responsibility for her conduct. The District Court accepted 
Diaz's guilty plea at a hearing on May 18, 1999. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. That section provides that whoever "knowingly engages or attempts to 
engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is 
of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful 
activity" may be subject to fine and imprisonment for up to ten years. 
See 18 U.S.C. SS 1957(a), (b). 
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The presentence investigation report ("PSI") computed a 
total offense level under the sentencing guidelines of 22. 
The report calculated a base offense level of 17, applying 
U.S.S.G. S 2S1.2, the guideline applicable to a S 1957(a) 
offense. The PSI increased this by four levels because the 
value of the funds was between $600,000 and $1 million, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. SS 2S1.2(b)(2) and 2S1.1(b)(2)(E); by 
two levels because the funds were proceeds of specified 
unlawful activity, pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2S1.2(b)(1)(B); and 
by another two levels based on Diaz's managerial r ole with 
respect to other participants in the criminal conduct, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1(c). The PSI then 
recommended a three-level downward adjustment for 
acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
SS 3E1.1(a), (b). Diaz had no prior criminal record, giving 
her a criminal history category of I. The guideline range 
under the PSI was 41 to 51 months. The PSI also 
determined that the government was entitled to restitution, 
pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act 
("MVRA"), 18 U.S.C. S 3663A and 18 U.S.C. S 3664(f)(1)(A), 
in the amount of $846,000 and that Diaz was liable for full 
restitution. 
 
Diaz objected to three aspects of the PSI. First, she 
argued that, under our decision in United States v. Smith, 
186 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 1999), her conduct was outside the 
heartland of the money laundering guideline and she 
therefore should have been sentenced under the fraud 
guideline, U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1. This would have r esulted in a 
base offense level of six, a total offense level of 18, and a 
prison range of 27 to 33 months. Second, Diaz ar gued that 
some of the $846,000 received by the Franklin School from 
the DOE, and therefore ordered in restitution, was not 
improperly used and that any amounts legitimately used 
should be deducted from the restitution amount. Finally, 
Diaz sought an additional downward departur e for 
diminished capacity. 
 
At sentencing on February 4, 2000, the District Court 
heard testimony and arguments on those objections. The 
Court rejected Diaz's argument as to the appropriate 
guideline, stating that this was a money laundering offense. 
The Court granted a two-level departure for diminished 
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capacity, reducing the offense level to 20, a custody range 
of 33 to 41 months; the court sentenced Diaz to 33 months, 
the bottom of that range.5 The Court ordered that Diaz pay 
restitution in the amount of $846,000, although the Court 
allowed credit for any amounts that Diaz could show had 
been paid back. 
 




The District Court had original jurisdiction over an 
offense against the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction over an appeal of a 
final decision by a District Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291, and over an appeal of a final sentence in a criminal 
case, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a). 
 
III. APPLICABLE GUIDELINE 
 
We first address Diaz's argument, based upon our 
decision in Smith, supra, that the District Court erred in 
computing her sentence by applying the money laundering 
guideline, U.S.S.G. S 2S1.2, rather than the fraud guideline, 
U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1. Diaz was convicted of four separate 
offenses, including fraud under 18 U.S.C.SS 1341 and 
1342, and money laundering, under S 1957(a), for engaging 
in a monetary transaction in criminally derived pr operty 
from specified unlawful activity. 
 
Under the sentencing guidelines, the District Court must 
group the counts into a single unit when ther e are multiple 
counts all involving substantially the same har m to the 
same victim and two or more acts or transactions 
connected by a common criminal objective or constituting 
part of a common scheme or plan. See U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2(b); 
see also Smith, 186 F.3d at 297. The victim in all of Diaz's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. During the sentencing hearing, the parties discussed what the 
guideline range would have been had the District Court accepted Diaz's 
argument and sentenced under the fraud guideline. After the two-level 
reduction for diminished capacity, the total of fense level would be 16, 
resulting in a custody range of 21 to 27 months. 
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offenses was the same, the DOE. All of her acts were part 
of a common plan: to keep the Franklin School eligible for, 
and continuing to receive, Pell and Staf ford funds by 
reducing the school's student default rates. After grouping 
the offenses, the District Court must apply to the entire 
group the highest offense level applicable to the counts in 
the unit. See U.S.S.G. SS 3D1.3(a), 3D1.4; see also Smith, 
186 F.3d at 297. In the instant case, S 2S1.2, the money 
laundering guideline, carried a base offense level of 17, 
while S 2F1.1, for fraud, carried a base of fense level of 6; 
therefore, the District Court applied the higher guideline for 
money laundering to the entire unit. The initial choice of 
guideline is a legal question that, having been raised by 
Diaz before the District Court, is subject to plenary review 




We first must consider whether to apply the pre- 
amendment sentencing guidelines, as we interpr eted them 
in Smith, or the sentencing guidelines as amended by 
Amendment 591, effective November 1, 2000. 6 The general 
rule is that a defendant should be sentenced under the 
guideline in effect at the time of sentencing. See United 
States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 566 (3d Cir . 1994) (citations 
omitted); U.S.S.G. S 1B1.11(a). Diaz was sentenced in 
February 2000, prior to the effective date of Amendment 
591. But an amended guideline may be applied 
retroactively if it merely clarifies the law in existence at the 
time of sentencing. See United States v. Mar molejos, 140 
F.3d 488, 490 (3d Cir. 1998). The question, therefore, is 
whether Amendment 591 clarifies the prior version of the 
guidelines so that it can be applied retr oactively to Diaz's 
sentence. If it can be applied retroactively, we must affirm 
the sentence. 
 
We avoided the question of retroactivity in Mustafa, 238 
F.3d at 496, because we concluded that the District Court's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Note that Amendment 591 was not yet ef fective when we heard oral 
argument in this appeal on September 14, 2000. If our opinion had been 
issued before November 1, 2000, the above discussion of the effect of the 
Amendment would not be necessary. 
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decision to sentence under the money laundering guideline 
was appropriate either under the amended guidelines or 
under the Smith framework. By contrast, because the Smith 
approach may produce a differ ent result than will the 
amended guidelines in the instant case, the issue of 
retroactivity is squarely befor e us for resolution. To answer 
this question, we must compare the sentencing approach 
under Smith with the approach r equired under the 
amended guidelines. Smith, like the pr esent case involved 
multiple counts of conviction; in Smith, embezzlement and 
money laundering. As we note above, S 3D1.3 pr ovides that 
in a group of closely related counts, the offense level 
applicable to the group is that of the count with the highest 
offense level. The applicable offense level is found by 
referring to the Statutory Index (Appendix A). 
 
In Smith, we instructed the District Court to consult 
Appendix A for a list of guidelines that corr espond to the 
statute of conviction (the count with the highest of fense 
level, i.e., money laundering). The Intr oduction to the 
Statutory Index (Appendix A) provided, however , that, if " `in 
an atypical case' the guideline indicated for the statute of 
conviction is `inappropriate because of the particular 
conduct involved,' the court is instructed to use the 
guideline `most applicable to the nature of the offense 
conduct charged.' " Smith, 186 F .3d at 297 (quoting U.S. 
Sentencing Manual App. A at 417 (Introduction)); see U.S. 
Sentencing Manual app. A Intro. at 425 (1998). We 
concluded that the guidelines required the sentencing court 
to perform a heartland analysis in making the initial choice 
of the appropriate guideline to apply in or der to determine 
whether the conduct being punished falls within a set of 
typical cases embodying the conduct described in each 
guideline.7 See id. at 297-98 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Koon v. United States, 
518 U.S. 81, 94 (1996) (discussing heartland analysis and 
the power of district courts in imposing sentence to 
consider circumstances not considered by the Sentencing 
Commission in creating the guidelines). W e created a two- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. This heartland analysis was identical to that performed in the context 
of a request for a departure from the guidelines. See Smith, 186 F.3d at 
298. 
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step approach, with a court first deciding whether the 
conduct is "atypical" of the conduct usually punished 
under the statute of conviction (money laundering) and, 
second, if it is atypical, determining what other guideline 
would be more appropriate for sentencing. See Smith, 186 
F.3d at 297 (citing United States v. V oss, 956 F.2d 1007, 
1009 (10th Cir. 1992)). 
 
Amendment 591 changed U.S.S.G. SS 1B1.1 and 1B1.2, 
the Application Note to S 1B1.2, and the Intr oduction to the 
Statutory Index (Appendix A), and in doing so, appar ently 
abrogates the Smith analysis. See Mustafa, 238 F.3d at 496 
(suggesting, but not deciding, that "the continued relevance 
of Smith is open to question"). Section 1B1.1(a) was 
amended to delete language providing that the Statutory 
Index (Appendix A) "provides a listing to assist" in 
determining the applicable offense guideline. See U.S. 
Sentencing Manual app. C at 29 (Supp. 2000).8 Section 
1B1.2(a) was amended to replace the phrase"most 
applicable" with "applicable" in instructing courts to 
determine the guideline to be applied to the offense of 
conviction. See U.S. Sentencing Manual app. C at 29 
(Supp. 2000).9 The Amendment also deleted language in 
Application Note 1 to S 1B1.2 providing that, "as a general 
rule," the sentencing court was to use the guideline "most 
applicable" to the offense of conviction and that the 
Statutory Index (Appendix A) would "assist" in this 
determination. See U.S. Sentencing Manual S 1B1.2, 
Application Note 1, at 16 (1998). The new Application Note 
unequivocally provides that the "court is to use" the 
guideline provided in the Statutory Index (Appendix A) for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Compare U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1(a) (1998) ("Determine the applicable offense 
guideline section from Chapter Two. . . . The Statutory Index (Appendix 
A) provides a listing to assist in this determination.") (emphasis added) 
with U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1(a) (2000) ("Deter mine, . . . the offense guideline 
section from Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) applicable to the offense of 
conviction."). 
 
9. Compare U.S.S.G. S 1B1.2(a) (1998) ("Determine the offense guideline 
section in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) most applicable to the offense 
of conviction[.]") (emphasis added) with U.S.S.G. S 1B1.2(a) (2000) 
("Determine the offense guideline section in Chapter Two (Offense 
Conduct) applicable to the offense of conviction[.]") (emphasis added). 
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the offense of conviction. See U.S. Sentencing Manual 
S 1B1.2, Application Note 1, at 16 (2000); see also U.S. 
Sentencing Manual app. C at 30 (Supp. 2000) (explaining 
changes to Application Note). Finally, and most importantly, 
Amendment 591 removed from the Intr oduction to the 
Statutory Index (Appendix A) the language on which we 
relied in Smith, 186 F.3d at 297, instructing courts to, "in 
an atypical case," where "the guideline section indicated for 
the statute of conviction is inappropriate because of the 
particular conduct involved, use the guideline section most 
applicable to the nature of the offense conduct charged in 
the count of which the defendant was convicted." See U.S. 
Sentencing Manual app. A Intro. at 425 (1998); see also 
U.S. Sentencing Manual app. C at 30-31 (Supp. 2000) 
(describing changes to Statutory Index). 
 
The amendment reflects a change from the permissive to 
the mandatory. The sentencing court no longer uses the 
Statutory Index (Appendix A) as an aid in finding the most 
applicable guideline among several possibilities; the 
Statutory Index (Appendix A) now conclusively points the 
court to the one guideline applicable in a given case. 
 
The Sentencing Commission specifically cited Smith in 
explaining that the Amendment was intended, in part, to 
overturn case law which permitted the courts in multiple 
count cases to select a guideline based on factors other 
than the conduct charged in the offense of conviction which 
carries the highest offense level. See U.S. Sentencing 
Manual app. C at 31 (Supp. 2000). The Amendment sought 
"to emphasize that the sentencing court must apply the 
offense guideline referenced in the Statutory Index for the 
statute of conviction," unless the case falls within a narrow 
exception not applicable to the instant case. See U.S. 
Sentencing Manual app. C at 32 (Supp. 2000) (emphasis 
added). The Commission particularly noted that some 
courts had declined to use the offense guidelines referenced 
in the Statutory Index (Appendix A) in cases that were 
atypical or outside the heartland of a guideline, again citing 
Smith. See U.S. Sentencing Manual app. C at 32 (Supp. 
2000). 
 
The only fair reading of the Amendment and of the 
amended guidelines is that Smith, and its approach to 
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applying the guidelines, is no longer good law. In cases, 
such as the instant one, in which several counts, including 
fraud and money laundering, have been grouped pursuant 
to U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2(b), the count carrying the highest 
applicable offense level must apply to the entire group for 
sentencing purposes. See U.S.S.G. SS 3D1.3(a), 3D1.4; see 
also Smith, 186 F.3d at 297. Under the guidelines as 
amended, sentencing courts may not conduct an inquiry 
into the heartland of S 2S1.2 and courts have no discretion 
to decide that the money laundering guideline is 
inappropriate or not the most applicable guideline on the 
facts of a given case. 
 
A post-sentencing amendment to a guideline, or to its 
comments, should be given retroactive ef fect only if the 
amendment "clarifies" the guideline or comment in place at 
the time of sentencing; the amendment may not be given 
retroactive effect if it effects a substantive change in the 
law. See Marmolejos, 140 F.3d at 490. 
 
Although there is no bright line for distinguishing 
between a substantive and clarifying amendment, we have 
suggested that courts should look to the language of the 
amendment, its purpose and effect, and whether the 
guideline and commentary in effect at the time of 
sentencing is consistent with the amended sentencing 
manual. See id. at 491; United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 
1384, 1405 (3d Cir. 1994). Generally, if the amended 
guideline and commentary overrules a prior judicial 
construction of the guidelines, it is substantive; if it 
confirms our prior reading of the guidelines and does not 
disturb prior precedent, it is clarifying. See id. This analysis 
may also implicate constitutional concerns because the 
retroactive application of a sentencing pr ovision will violate 
the Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws, 
see U.S. Const. art. I, S 9, cl. 3, when such application 
would "disadvantage" the defendant affected by it. See 
United States v. Bogusz, 43 F.3d 82, 93 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1405; Menon, 24 F.3d at 566. 
 
With this standard and the contours of the pre- 
amendment and amended guidelines in mind, it is clear 
that Amendment 591 effects a substantive change to the 
Sentencing Guidelines as we interpreted them in Smith. For 
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that reason, it cannot be applied retr oactively to Diaz's 
sentence. The amendment plainly abrogates and overrules 
our prior construction of the guidelines in Smith and its 
progeny. The Sentencing Commission explicitly cited Smith 
as a court decision improperly choosing a guideline based 
on considerations other than the statute of conviction, 
strongly suggesting that the very purpose of the 
amendment was to eliminate Smith. The amendment 
deleted language from the Introduction to the Statutory 
Index (Appendix A) on which we relied for our approach. 
 
The amendment also alters courts' actual practice in 
sentencing. Smith and its progeny wer e in agreement that 
the guidelines required a sentencing court to conduct a 
heartland analysis in selecting the most appr opriate 
guideline for sentencing in the first instance, considering 
whether the conduct at issue is "atypical;" if the court 
concluded that the conduct was atypical or anomalous, it 
was to sentence under a more appropriate guideline. See 
Bockius, 228 F.3d at 311-12; Smith , 186 F.3d at 297. Thus, 
conduct outside the heartland of money laundering was to 
be sentenced under a different guideline, such as the fraud 
guideline. See Smith, 186 F.3d at 300 (holding that 
sentence in anomalous case of money laundering and fraud 
should be under fraud guideline, rather than money 
laundering guideline).10 
 
Retroactive application raises ex post facto problems in 
the instant case because Diaz potentially would be 
disadvantaged by such retroactivity. Under Smith and its 
progeny, Diaz could have been sentenced under the fraud 
guideline rather than the money laundering guideline, 
resulting in a sentence of 6-12 fewer months in prison, 
were a court to find that her primary of fense conduct was 
fraud, with money laundering only a minor, incidental part 
of that overall conduct. See infra Part III.B. She therefore 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The only difference in the later cases applying Smith was our 
determination of the contours of the heartland of the money laundering 
guidelines and our conclusion in those cases that the conduct at issue 
was, in fact, within the heartland of money laundering. See Bockius, 228 
F.3d at 313 (holding that conduct at issue constitutes typical money 
laundering and therefore was in the heartland of that guideline for 
sentencing purposes); Cefaratti, 221 F .3d at 514-15 (same). 
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may be entitled to be resentenced under S 2F1.1, depending 
on the facts of her case and whether or not her conduct 
falls within the heartland of money laundering. See infra 
Part III.C. On the other hand, under the guidelines as 
amended, no heartland analysis is necessary or pr oper and 
Diaz would not have an opportunity to receive the lesser 
sentence; she must be sentenced under the money 
laundering guideline and we would be compelled to affirm 
her sentence without further analysis. The Constitution 
does not, however, permit retr oactive application of an 
amended sentencing guideline where, as her e, a harsher 
penalty might result. See Menon, 24 F .3d at 566. 
 
Nevertheless, the Government argues that the 
Amendment is clarifying and therefore capable of 
retroactive application. It points to the Sentencing 
Commission's characterization of the Amendment as 
intended to "clarify" the inter-r elationship among SS 1B1.1 
and 1B1.2 and the Statutory Index (Appendix A) and as 
being a "clarification" intended to "emphasize that the 
sentencing court must apply the offense guideline 
referenced in the Statutory Index." See U.S. Sentencing 
Manual app. C at 31-32 (Supp. 2000). The Sentencing 
Commission's characterization of an amendment as 
"clarifying" is not, however, binding on us, nor even entitled 
to substantial weight. See Bertoli, 40 F .3d at 1407 n.21 
(citing Menon, 24 F.3d at 567); see also Marmolejos, 140 
F.3d at 493 ("[T]he mere fact that an amendment is referred 
to as a clarification or a revision is or dinarily of slight 
import to our analysis."). Rather, it is our own 
interpretation of the pre-amendment guidelines that 
determines whether the Amendment clarified that 
interpretation or substantively changed it. See Marmolejos, 
140 F.3d at 493; Bertoli, 40 F .3d at 1407 n.21. 
 
Moreover, a "clarifying" amendment cannot be used to 
interpret an earlier guideline when the r esult would be to 
punish the defendant more harshly, as might be the case 
here. See Menon, 24 F.3d at 567. Thus, the Commission's 
characterization of Amendment 591 does not af fect our 
conclusion that the Amendment is, in fact, substantive and 
incapable of retroactive application. For the same reason, 
we disapprove the decision from the Middle District of 
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Pennsylvania in United States v. Bifield, 124 F. Supp. 2d 
307, 311 (M.D. Pa. 2000), in which the court held that 
Amendment 591 was clarifying, based on nothing mor e 
than acceptance of the Sentencing Commission's 
characterization of the Amendment as such. 
 
Our independent interpretation and analysis of 
Amendment 591 establishes that it substantively changed 
the sentencing guidelines as we interpreted them in Smith 
and its progeny and its application in the instant case 
would raise ex post facto problems. The amended guidelines 
cannot constitutionally be applied to Diaz's sentence. We 
therefore will apply the pre-amendment guidelines, 
meaning the analysis established in Smith and its progeny, 




We turn now to the application of the pre-amendment 
guidelines, as we interpreted them in Smith  and its 
progeny. The Smith approach r equires that we conduct a 
heartland analysis of the money laundering guidelines, 
determine whether Diaz's conduct is atypical of cases 
ordinarily sentenced under that guideline, and, if so, 
determine what guideline would be more appropriate given 
her offense conduct. There are several decisions from this 
Circuit, involving convictions for both fraud and money 
laundering, that affect our analysis. 
 
In Smith, we first suggested that District Courts should 
not automatically apply the money laundering guideline to 
a group of offenses that includes a money laundering 
charge, where the overall conduct is not in the heartland of 
the money laundering guideline and its application 
"obscures the overarching directive to match the guideline 
to the offense conduct which formed the basis of the 
underlying conviction." Smith, 186 F .3d at 300. In Smith, 
the defendants were convicted of four of fenses: conspiracy 
to defraud, interstate transportation of stolen pr operty, 
causing unlawful interstate transportation with intent to 
distribute stolen property, and money laundering under 18 
U.S.C. S 1956. See id. at 296-97. In the embezzlement-and- 
kickback scheme at work in Smith, the money laundering 
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was based on the fact that defendant Dandrea wr ote out 
checks on the proceeds of kickbacks and defendant Smith 
ordered that many of these checks be made payable to his 
creditors rather than directly to Smith. See id. at 300. The 
District Court grouped the four offenses and calculated the 
sentence under S 2S1.1, the guideline applicable to the 
money laundering count. 
 
On appeal, we vacated the sentences of both defendants 
and remanded for resentencing under the fraud guideline, 
rather than the money laundering guideline. See id. at 300. 
We relied on a 1997 report to Congr ess by the Sentencing 
Commission, in which the Commission stated that the high 
base offense levels for money laundering r eflected an effort 
to punish the activities which aroused Congr essional 
concern: "1) situations in which the `laundered' funds 
derived from serious underlying criminal conduct such as 
a significant drug trafficking operation or or ganized crime; 
and, 2) situations in which the financial transaction was 
separate from the underlying crime and was undertaken to 
either: a) make it appear that the funds wer e legitimate, or 
b) promote additional criminal conduct by r einvesting the 
funds in additional criminal conduct." Smith , 186 F.3d at 
298 (quoting United States Sentencing Commission, Report 
to Congress: Sentencing Policy for Money Laundering 
Offenses, including Comments on Department of Justice 
Report 4 (1997) [hereinafter "Report to Congress"]). This 
type of conduct, then, was the heartland of the money 
laundering guidelines. 
 
We also noted that the money laundering guideline had 
been roundly criticized by judges concer ned with the 
unwarranted harshness of sentences imposed under the 
money laundering guideline in particular cases and that 
judges routinely granted downward departur es to avoid 
such harsh results. See Smith, 186 F .3d at 298-99. The 
Commission in 1995 proposed amendments to the money 
laundering guideline, designed to provide penalties more 
proportionate to " `both the seriousness of the underlying 
criminal conduct' and to `the nature and seriousness of the 
laundering conduct itself.' " Id. at 299 (quoting United 
States v. Woods, 159 F.3d1132, 1135 (8th Cir. 1998)). But 
the amendments were not approved by Congr ess. The 
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House Judiciary Committee did acknowledge, however , that 
"the application of the current guidelines to receipt-and- 
deposit cases, as well as to certain other cases that do not 
involve aggravated money laundering activity, may be 
problematic." See id. at 299 (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-272, at 
14-15, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335, 348-49) 
(internal quotation marks and emphasis in Smith omitted). 
However, "past sentencing anomalies arising from relatively 
few cases do not justify a sweeping downward adjustment 
in the money laundering guidelines." See Smith, 186 F.3d at 
299 (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-272, at 15, r eprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 349) (internal quotation marks and 
emphasis in Smith omitted)). To do otherwise, the 
Committee suggested, would send the dangerous message 
that money laundering associated with drug and other 
serious crimes was not viewed as a grave offense. See 
Smith, 186 F.3d at 299 (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-272, at 15, 
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 349). 
 
We concluded that Congress intended that those 
"anomalies" should be controlled by the courts. See Smith, 
186 F.3d at 299. And the courts should deal with such 
cases fairly, not with a strict focus on the technicalities of 
sentencing, but with an eye towards matching the guideline 
to the underlying criminal conduct. See id. at 300 (quoting 
United States v. Kuko, 129 F.3d 1435, 1440 (11th Cir. 
1997)). To apply the money laundering guideline in a 
routine fraud case would be, we held, to "let the `tail wag 
the dog.' " See Smith, 186 F.3d at 300. In Smith, we decided 
that the money laundering guideline was inappr opriate 
because the defendants left a paper trail, conduct 
inconsistent with concealment, because any ef forts at 
concealment were disingenuous, and because, when 
evaluated against the entire course of conduct, the money 
laundering was an incidental by-product of r outine fraud. 
See id. The overall conduct at issue was not in the 
heartland of the money laundering guideline and that 
guideline was not to be used in sentencing. 
 
Our first opportunity to apply Smith came several months 
ago in the case involving Diaz's brother, Frank Cefaratti,11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Cefaratti was charged separately fr om his sister, Diaz, and the other 
parties involved in the criminal conduct. He was indicted on 27 counts 
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and his role in the same scheme to fraudulently obtain 
student financial assistance funds on behalf of the Franklin 
School. Cefaratti was sentenced under the money 
laundering guideline but argued on appeal that, under 
Smith, he should have been sentenced under the fraud 
guideline.12 We affir med the sentence, rejecting Cefaratti's 
suggestion that Smith had limited the money laundering 
guideline only to large-scale drug trafficking and organized 
crime. See Cefaratti, 221 F.3d at 513. In particular, we 
noted that, in numerous pre-Smith decisions, we did not 
question the propriety of sentencing under the money 
laundering guideline in cases involving both a scheme to 
defraud and the laundering of the proceeds of that scheme. 
See id. (citing cases). We held that the Smith court "gave no 
indication that it intended a radical departur e from this 
precedent." Id. Rather, we interpreted Smith as requiring 
use of the fraud guideline where the money laundering, 
although technically a violation of the statute, was merely 
an "incidental by product" of otherwise r outine fraud. See 
id. at 514 (citing Smith, 186 F.3d at 300). 
 
In particular, Cefaratti clarified a key point underlying 
our decision in Smith: that the Sentencing Commission in 
its report to Congress had suggested that the heartland of 
money laundering included not only the proceeds of serious 
drug trafficking and organized crime but also situations in 
which separate financial transactions were undertaken 
either to legitimize illegally obtained funds or to promote 
additional criminal conduct. See Cefaratti, 221 F.3d at 514 
(citing Smith, 186 F.3d at 298 (citing, in turn, Report to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
in September 1998. In October 1998 he entered a plea agreement in 
which he pled guilty to four counts, including one count of mail fraud, 
one count of student loan fraud, one count of destruction of property to 
prevent seizure, and one count of money laundering under S 1957. He 
pled guilty in October 1998 and was sentenced in 1999, inter alia, to 51 
months in prison and ordered to pay r estitution in the amount of 
$846,000, the DOE's full loss. See Cefaratti, 221 F.3d at 504. 
 
12. Unlike Diaz in the instant case, Cefaratti did not object to the use 
of 
the money laundering guideline before the District Court. Therefore we 
reviewed his sentence under the plain err or standard. See Cefaratti, 221 
F.3d at 512 (citing United States v. Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 
1997)). 
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Congress at 4)). Therefore, the heartland of U.S.S.G. 
S 2S1.2 included separate monetary transactions designed 
to conceal past criminal conduct or to promote further 
criminal conduct. 
 
The evidence in that case demonstrated that Cefaratti 
reinvested the proceeds of the mail and wire fraud in the 
school and therefore used the proceeds to continue the 
fraud. He continued the operation of the school, which only 
survived by receiving 90 percent of its r evenue from student 
financial assistance program funds. See Cefaratti, 221 F.3d 
at 514-15. The continued operation of the school enabled it 
to receive Pell and Stafford funds to which it was not 
entitled after February 1996 (the point at which the 1993 
default rate was calculated). This was differ ent than Smith, 
which involved only routine fraud and the r eceipt, deposit, 
and use of the proceeds of that fraud without serious 
attempts to fund further criminal activity. 
 
A short time later, in Bockius, we held that the District 
Court erred in sentencing the defendant under the fraud 
guideline rather than the money laundering guideline. The 
defendant there stole more than $600,000 from an 
insurance brokerage firm, wired it to several accounts, 
converted the money to cash, gambled some of it away, 
then went to the Cayman Islands with the remainder. Once 
there, he formed a corporation and bought a house in the 
name of the corporation using some of the cash. He 
planned to deposit the remainder in dif ferent banks in 
deposits of less than $10,000 in order to avoid reporting 
requirements. See Bockius, 228 F .3d at 307-08. Instead, he 
formed a partnership with another individual, who in turn 
stole the remainder of the money from the defendant. See 
id. at 308. The defendant pled guilty to, inter alia, wire 
fraud and money laundering under 18 U.S.C. S 1956. His 
initial sentence, calculated under S 2S1.1, was vacated; on 
resentencing, the District Court sentenced him under 
S 2F1.1. The court read Smith as limiting the money 
laundering guideline only to drugs and serious, meaning 
organized, crime, not the kind of conduct at issue in that 
case. See id. at 309. 
 
We reversed, holding that the District Court had 
misinterpreted Smith. We r ecognized that there was 
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language at one point in the Smith decision to support the 
narrow reading urged by the defendant;13 we held, however, 
that Smith makes clear that the heartland of money 
laundering also includes "typical money laundering in 
which a defendant knowingly conducted a financial 
transaction to conceal tainted funds or funnel them into 
additional criminal conduct." Bockius, 228 F.3d at 312 
(citing Smith, 186 F.3d at 298). Further review of the 
comments by the Sentencing Commission and Congr ess, 
discussed in Smith, reinforced our view that "S 2S1.1 is 
intended to apply to defendants who knowingly conduct 
financial transactions apart from an underlying criminal 
offense to conceal that the proceeds involved are tainted. 
We held no differently in Smith." Bockius, 228 F.3d at 311. 
We also pointed to cases from other cir cuits supporting the 
proposition that, while the heartland of the money 
laundering guideline is narrower than the money 
laundering statute, its scope is not limited only to drug 
trafficking and organized crime. See id.  at 312-13 (citing 
cases). The defendant in Bockius acknowledged engaging in 
several separate acts designed to conceal the illegal source 
of the money and his ownership of it, including multiple 
wire transfers, conversion of the funds to cash, deposits in 
multiple bank accounts in amounts small enough to avoid 
reporting requirements, formation of a corporate fiction, 
and placement of the funds in a partnership with another 
individual. See id. at 313. We r emanded for the District 
Court to determine whether these actions constituted 
typical money laundering so as to fall within the heartland 
of the money laundering guideline. 
 
Most recently, in Mustafa, we held that the District Court 
had not committed plain error in sentencing a defendant to 
135 months imprisonment, applying S 2S1.1, where the 
defendant had pled guilty to, inter alia, 40 counts of money 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The defendant and the District Court r elied on the following 
language: 
 
       Ultimately, we conclude that the Sentencing Commission itself has 
       indicated that the heartland of U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1 is the money 
       laundering activity connected with extensive drug trafficking and 
       serious crime. Smith 186 F.3d at 300. 
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laundering, as well as counts of mail fraud, food stamp 
fraud, and making false statements in obtaining a bank 
loan. See Mustafa, 238 F.3d at 488. The defendant had 
deposited more than $1.5 million worth of fraudulently 
obtained food stamps in a bank account. See id.  We 
discussed at length our prior circuit case law and 
recognized that the conduct involved was less akin to 
traditional notions of money laundering than the conduct 
at issue in Bockius. See id. at 495. Nevertheless, we held 
that the deposits were intended to disguise the source and 
nature of the proceeds and to create an appearance of their 
legitimacy, making sentencing under S 2S1.1 appropriate. 
See id. The deposits, necessary to give the food stamps any 
value, were intended to effectuate the concealment of the 
original source of those funds. See id. at 495-96. 
 
The United States in its briefs relies on another case, 
United States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 1999), 
decided several months prior to Smith. The United States 
believes Morelli is significant because we stated, in dictum, 
that the proposed, but disapproved, amendments to the 
Sentencing Guidelines did not provide independent legal 
authority for a downward departure. See Morelli, 169 F.3d 
at 809 n.13. We rejected the defendant's arguments 
because the defendant was challenging the District Court's 
exercise of its discretion in denying a downward departure, 
a claim that we were without jurisdiction to consider. See 
id.; see also United States v. Khalil, 132 F.3d 897, 898 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (holding that there was no jurisdiction on appeal 
to review a discretionary downward departure). Morelli 
involved a scheme to avoid the payment of excise taxes on 
the sale of certain fuels. The defendants or ganized a group 
of companies into a "daisy chain," in which oil would be 
sold down the chain in a series of paper transactions, sold 
by the company at the bottom of the chain to a legitimate 
retailer, and the money sent back up the chain in a series 
of wire transfers, with one of the companies, the so-called 
"burn company," collecting the taxes, then disappearing. 
See Morelli, 169 F.3d at 803. W e held that the tax money 
was the proceeds of the entire ongoing wir e fraud venture, 
consisting of all the individual series of transactions. See 
id. at 806. The entire program constituted one large, 
ongoing wire fraud scheme and each wiring up and down 
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the chain furthered the execution of each individual act of 
tax fraud. See id. at 806-07. Therefor e, the money gained in 
each series of transactions (except the first one) was the 
proceeds of wire fraud, because it was pr oceeds of a fraud 
furthered by the prior wire transfers. See id. at 807. Thus, 
there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of 
money laundering and to sentence him under the money 




We now must apply those legal principles to the instant 
case. In doing so, and in exercising plenary r eview, we 
conclude that Diaz should have been sentenced under the 
fraud guideline and she therefore is entitled to a new 
sentencing hearing. 
 
We first reject the government's contention that Morelli 
controls or even is relevant to the instant case. The issue 
that we addressed in Morelli was whether the government 
had presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction 
for money laundering and therefore to support use of the 
money laundering guideline in sentencing; we concluded 
that it indeed had presented sufficient evidence. See Morelli, 
169 F.3d at 809. We did not addr ess the issue of whether 
that conduct was typical, or in the heartland, of the money 
laundering guideline for sentencing purposes. In fact, we 
could not analyze that issue at all because the defendant 
was challenging the District Court's exercise of its 
discretion in declining to depart downwar d, a decision that 
we did not have jurisdiction to review. See id. at 809 n.13. 
By contrast, the precise question presented in the instant 
case is whether the District Court erred in its initial choice 
of guideline, a question that we do have jurisdiction to 
consider and resolve. 
 
We also reject, as we did in Mustafa , Bockius, and 
Cefaratti, a reading of Smith that would limit the use of the 
money laundering guidelines, U.S.S.G. SS 2S1.1 and 2S1.2,14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1 is the guideline applicable to money laundering 
convictions under 18 U.S.C. S 1956; U.S.S.G.S 2S1.2 is the guideline 
applicable to money laundering convictions under 18 U.S.C. S 1957. 
Smith, Bockius, and Mustafa involved convictions under S 1956 and 
sentencing under S 2S1.1; Cefaratti and the instant case involve 
convictions under S 1957 and sentencing underS 2S1.2. 
 
                                23 
  
only to cases involving the proceeds of lar ge-scale drug 
trafficking and organized crime. See Bockius, 228 F.3d at 
309; Cefaratti, 221 F.3d at 513. Rather, Mustafa, Bockius, 
Cefaratti, and Smith all are in accord that the heartland of 
the money laundering guidelines includes, in addition to 
drugs and organized crime, cases involving typical money 
laundering, financial transactions that ar e separate from 
the underlying crime and that are designed either to make 
illegally obtained funds appear legitimate, to conceal the 
source of some funds, or to promote additional criminal 
conduct by reinvesting the funds in additional criminal 
conduct. See Mustafa, 238 F.3d at 495; Bockius, 228 F.3d 
at 312; Cefaratti, 221 F.3d at 514; Smith, 186 F.3d at 298. 
 
However, in those cases not governed by the Sentencing 
Guidelines as amended in November 2000, the money 
laundering guidelines are not applicable to or dinary cases 
of routine fraud, to the simple receipt and deposit or use of 
illegally obtained funds, or to cases in which any money 
laundering is not separate from the underlying fraud, but 
merely an "incidental by product" of that underlying fraud. 
See Mustafa, 238 F.3d at 494-95; Bockius, 228 F.3d at 311; 
Cefaratti, 221 F.3d at 514; Smith, 186 F.3d at 300. 
Sentencing under the money laundering guidelines is not 
appropriate in cases in which the money laundering is 
minimal when evaluated against the overall of fense 
conduct. See Bockius, 228 F.3d at 313; Cefaratti, 221 F.3d 
at 515; Smith, 186 F.3d at 300. 
 
We conclude that where the defendant has not made a 
serious, concerted effort to conceal or to legitimize the 
funds or to reinvest them in additional criminal activity, it 
is not appropriate to sentence that defendant under the 
money laundering guideline. Congress and the Sentencing 
Commission considered such cases anomalous fr om the 
standpoint of S 2S1.2 and left it to the courts to deal with 
such atypical cases fairly, by focusing not on the strict 
technicalities of the sentencing process, but on matching 
the appropriate guideline to the nature of the offense 
conduct. See Smith, 186 F.3d at 300. We believe that 
sentencing in such cases is more appropriately controlled 
by the guideline applicable to the underlying criminal 
conduct, such as fraud. 
 
                                24 
  
We agree with the application of this legal standard to the 
facts in Cefaratti, Bockius, and Mustafa  and our conclusion 
in all three cases that money laundering was the 
appropriate guideline. The evidence showed that Cefaratti 
received federal student financial assistance funds on 
behalf of the Franklin School after February 1996, when, 
but for the fraud, the school probably would have been 
terminated from the Pell and Staf ford programs. Cefaratti 
used the fraudulently derived proceeds to pr omote further 
fraud, by continuing to receive federal funds to operate the 
school after it otherwise would have been shut down, 
including building an addition to the school with the federal 
funds and making payments to some lenders so it would 
appear that students were not in default. See Cefaratti, 221 
F.3d at 215. Such conduct was not incidental to or a 
minimal aspect of the underlying fraud. 
 
Similarly, the defendant in Bockius admitted that he 
engaged in several acts designed to conceal the illegal 
source of the money and his ownership and possession of 
it, including multiple wire transfers, conversion to cash, 
and deposits of small amounts of money in multiple bank 
accounts. See Bockius, 228 F.3d at 307-08, 313. We agree 
that such typical money laundering, designed to conceal 
the source of, and thereby legitimize, the funds is within 
the heartland of the guideline. In the same way, in Mustafa 
the defendant's deposits of food stamps "wer e intended to 
disguise the source and nature of the pr oceeds of his 
fraudulent activity" and to "effectuate" concealment of that 
original source. See Mustafa, 238 F .3d at 495-96. 
 
We believe, however, that under the facts of the instant 
case, the District Court erred in sentencing Diaz under the 
money laundering guideline rather than under the fraud 
guideline. The instant case demonstrates how dif ferent 
situations, even those involving the participants in the 
same criminal conduct, may require dif ferent results. Diaz 
never used the proceeds of her fraudulent activities to 
promote additional criminal conduct by r einvesting in 
further criminal conduct. The Franklin School was a 
legitimate enterprise during the period from 1992 and July 
1994, when Diaz submitted false forbearance and 
deferment forms. The 1993 default rate had not been 
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calculated during this time; therefore, the school was not 
yet subject to termination from the financial assistance 
programs, even absent Diaz's fraud. When Diaz transferred 
the Pell Grant and Stafford loan funds into the school's 
account, that monetary transaction maintained and 
promoted a legitimate enterprise, not further criminal 
conduct. We deal with a simple receipt-and-deposit case to 
which S 2S1.2 should not apply. Diaz made no efforts to 
disguise the source of the student assistance funds that the 
Franklin School received and deposited or to conceal the 
fact that the deposits were federal student assistance 
funds. 
 
Diaz did violate S 1957(a) because she engaged in a 
monetary transaction in criminally derived pr operty: She 
transferred funds, derived from fraud, into the school's 
account. See 18 U.S.C. S 1957(a) (making it illegal to 
"knowingly engage[ ] . . . in a monetary transaction in 
criminally derived property . . . derived fr om specified 
unlawful activity"). Having engaged in the fraud, Diaz used 
the proceeds to cover school expenses. Of course, the 
purpose of fraud, in almost all cases, is to obtain money or 
other property and to put it to some use. AS 1957(a) 
violation almost always will accompany the commission of 
such routine fraud. The deposit of the student assistance 
funds in the instant case accompanied the fraud that was 
used to obtain those funds; the deposits should not be 
viewed as separate from the underlying fraud, but as an 
inseparable and incidental by-product of that fraud. To 
sentence under S 2S1.2 in a case such as this one would 
indeed allow the money laundering guideline to swallow 
whole the fraud guideline or, as we said in Smith, "let the 
`tail wag the dog.' " See Smith, 186 F.3d at 300. 
 
The deposit of the funds also was minimal when 
evaluated against the totality of Diaz's unlawful conduct. At 
its heart, Diaz's offense conduct consisted of the 
preparation and submission of fraudulent defer ment and 
forbearance documents and submission of fraudulent 
student loan applications. This is a clear example of routine 
fraud. Any proceeds that were deposited prior to July 1994 
(the point at which Diaz stopped her involvement in the 
school) represented a small part of her conduct and a small 
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percentage of the moneys obtained from the DOE by the 
fraud. Diaz's fraud therefore is the appr opriate conduct to 
be considered for sentencing purposes and it should 
provide the guideline under which she should be sentenced. 
 
We believe that this is the anomalous case that Congress 
and the Sentencing Commission found "problematic," see 
Smith, 186 F.3d at 298 (quoting H.R. Rep. 104-272, at 14- 
15, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335m 347-49), at least 
under the law prior to the amendments to the Statutory 
Index-Appendix A. Diaz's conduct, although a violation of 
S 1957(a), is atypical and therefor e not in the heartland of 
S 2S1.2, as we understood and applied that guideline prior 
to the recent amendments. Under these facts, she should 
not be subject to punishment under the higher guideline. 
We therefore will vacate Diaz's sentence and remand for 




Diaz also challenges the order to pay r estitution of 
$846,000, the full amount of the DOE's loss, less any 
amounts Diaz could show had been paid. Diaz ar gues that 
Cefaratti also was made to pay the full amount in 
restitution and that two other people convicted in this 
scheme each were ordered to pay $1,000 in restitution. 
Diaz suggests that the District Court therefor e might have 
ordered restitution in an amount gr eater than the actual 
loss, which it cannot do. See United States v. Gottlieb, 140 
F.3d 865, 873-74 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). This 
objection was not raised below and we review only for plain 
error. Cefaratti, 221 F.3d at 512, Knobloch, 131 F.3d at 
370; see also United States v. Thompson, 113 F.3d 13, 15 
(2d Cir. 1997) (holding that improperly ordered restitution 
constitutes an illegal sentence amounting to plain error). 
 
The purpose of restitution under the MVRA is to 
compensate the victim for its losses and, to the extent 
possible, to make the victim whole. See United States v. 
Kress, 944 F.2d 155, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1991). It follows, 
therefore, that a District Court cannot or der multiple 
defendants to pay restitution in amounts that will result in 
the payment to the victim of an amount greater than the 
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victim's loss. See Gottlieb, 140 F.3d at 873-74. A District 
Court may, however, impose joint and several liability on 
multiple defendants for restitution, per mitting the victim to 
recover its losses from all or some of the wrongdoers. See 
United States v. Hunter, 52 F.3d 489, 494-95 (3d Cir. 1995). 
It appears that is what the District Court did, or intended 
to do, in the instant case. We therefor e affirm the order of 
restitution and the amount to be paid by Diaz. However, on 
remand, the lower court should clarify that the restitution 
obligations of Diaz, Cefaratti, and the other people involved 




For the foregoing reasons, Diaz's sentence is vacated and 
this matter is remanded for resentencing under the fraud 
guideline, U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1. The order of restitution is 
affirmed, although on resentencing the District Court shall 
clarify that Diaz's liability is joint and several. 
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